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The Shelleys and the Art of Suffering
JEREMY DAVIES
Abstract: Mary Shelley’s posthumous editions of Percy Shelley’s poetry and
prose have been regarded as striking examples of collaborative literary
achievement, but in her editorial annotations Mary represents her husband’s
work as the result of his innately solitary genius. She does so in particular by
associating his creative power with his constitutional ill-health. Via a reading
of Percy’s Julian and Maddalo, I argue that this connection between creativity
and bodily debility does not imply that his poetry annuls the social context of
its writing; instead, Mary seeks to ameliorate the conflict between
philanthropy and sociability that she detects in Percy’s work.
Keywords: collaboration, editing, illness, Julian and Maddalo, Mary
Wollstonecraft Shelley, Percy Bysshe Shelley
Seventeen years after she was widowed at the age of twenty-four, Mary
Wollstonecraft Shelley published the first ‘complete’ edition of Percy Shelley’s
poetry as a monument and eulogy to him. She justified her interventionist
editorial presentation of his texts in part by reference to her lasting sorrow at
his death. Her edition is marked by a burning sense of separation, but this
posthumous collaboration has frequently been read as an impressive exercise
in joint literary creativity. Literary collaboration is perhaps more readily
associated with conviviality, good cheer, and mutual encouragement, and it is
certainly the case that emphasising the camaraderie that fostered the writing
of poems, novels and essays in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries can distance us usefully from the spirit of serious intensity cultivated
by high Romanticism.1 Mary’s work, however, stands as a valuable reminder of
how broad the affective range of shared artistic labour can be. The critical
consequences of sorrowful collaboration are difficult to pin down, and in this
respect Mary’s co-creation of the Victorians’ Percy Shelley is especially, and
fruitfully, ambiguous. She claims that Percy’s poetry was fostered in part by
his chronic physical debility. This line of analysis, which may well appear
unrewarding at first, leads her commentary into a subtle and distinctive
relationship with the poems that she edits.
By her own account, Mary overcame enormous difficulties to produce in
1824 a volume of Percy’s Posthumous Poems,2 and then in 1839 two landmark
editions of The Poetical Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley. Her husband’s
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manuscripts were ‘so confused a mass, interlined and broken into fragments,
[...] that the sense could only be deciphered and joined by guesses, which might
seem rather intuitive than founded on reasoning’.3 The reference to intuition is
characteristic. Mary claimed that her editorial accomplishment was the result
not of disinterested scholarly enquiry but of her emotional connection to
Percy’s poetical remains and her ‘liveliest recollection of all that was done and
said during the period of my knowing him’.4 The manuscripts were ‘confusing
& tantalizing’;5 they ‘consisted of fragments of paper which in the hands of an
indifferent person would never have been decyphered — the labour of putting
it together was immense’. Indeed, ‘the volume might be all my writing’, she
declared.6 The effort required, and still more the strain of ‘having to think of &
write about the [past]’, brought on a bout of illness that drove her ‘to the verge
of insanity’.7 Yet despite everything, she insisted to Leigh Hunt, ‘[t]he edition
will be mine’.8
The texts that Mary was editing were indeed partly her own creations.
Percy, she revealed, had abandoned Rosalind and Helen and ‘Lines Written
Among the Euganean Hills’ until she ‘found [them] among his papers by
chance’, and persuaded him to complete them.9 The Cenci proved to have been
a collaborative effort from the start. Percy had ‘urged the subject to me as one
fitted for a tragedy [...] but I entreated him to write it instead’; as the play
progressed, they ‘talked over the arrangement of the scenes together’.10 The
most significant of all the contributions made by the new editions was the
mass of interpretive annotations that Mary interwove with the poems.
Prevented by Percy’s father from publishing a formal biography of her
husband, she instead presented in intimate juxtaposition with his texts a
piecemeal life history and critical commentary that offered a substantial and
soon highly influential framework for judging his whole achievement.11 So
extensive, in fact, was Mary’s contribution to the volumes that Jack Stillinger
included them among his list of ‘instances of unacknowledged multiple
authorship’ in canonical literary works.12 Susan Wolfson remarks on ‘the
considerable authority, at times co-creation, that [Mary’s] editing involved. [...]
By fragments and wholes, she virtually produced the basic “Shelley” texts and
canon’;13 Samuel Gladden, too, speaks of Mary ‘as co-writer, as co-creator’.14
If, as these scholars suggest, Mary’s notes and broader editorial project
represent the collaborative production of a Shelleyan corpus suited to early
Victorian audiences, then the theory of creativity she put forward in those
notes complicates matters considerably. Her interpretation of Percy’s work
seems potentially to be at odds with that of readers who appreciate the 1839
volumes all the more for their suggestion of shared authorship. Indeed, it
might imply an understanding of his poetry whereby that joint creativity
would seem to be little more than an unavoidable but largely regrettable
mediation of the author’s original vision. In Mary’s description, Percy
‘delivered up his soul to poetry, and felt happy when he sheltered himself from
the influence of human sympathies, in the wildest regions of fancy’.15
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He ‘had no care for any of his poems that did not emanate from the depths of
his mind, and develop some high or abstruse truth’.16 If some of his poems,
such as Rosalind and Helen, attend to ‘human life and the human heart’, and
so have at least the potential for broad popular appeal, a larger and more
characteristic group – The Witch of Atlas and The Triumph of Life are extreme
examples – pursue purely self-created goals, to the point of ‘discarding human
interest and passion’ in favour of ‘huntings after the obscure’.17
It is not that Percy was a misanthrope. Although his social habits were
retiring and much of his poetry stemmed from his solitary immersion in
natural beauty and Classical literature, nevertheless it was precisely his
fervent love for humankind and his commitment to radical social reform that
made his poetry too remote from the ‘human’. ‘[E]ven when employed on
subjects whose interest depended on character and incident’, Mary writes, ‘he
would start off in another direction, and leave the delineations of human
passion [...] for fantastic creations of his fancy, or the expression of those
opinions and sentiments with regard to human nature and its destiny; a desire
to diffuse which, was the master passion of his soul’.18 The very ideal of
humanity crowds out interaction with other people, as if Percy was himself
trapped in the predicament he tried to analyse in Alastor. Mary is in no doubt
of her husband’s genius, and yet she believes so intensely in the inherently
isolating nature of his creative instinct that her defence and popularisation of
his poetry repeatedly tells his readers that, as Mary Favret puts it, ‘both poet
and poetry are innately unsympathetic and inaccessible’.19 In fact, this is why
such active editorial co-creation and explication are needed: because Percy’s
genius is essentially unsociable, we must depend upon Mary to show us how to
read his oeuvre.
Mary accounts for the rebarbative character of Percy’s creativity in a way
that apparently takes to its greatest extreme the notion of creative power as a
solitary, internal force that transcends, or even nullifies, social explanation.
She figures his creativity as a function of physiology. His literary corpus stems
in part from the debility of his physical body, and the effort of composition in
turn renders him hypersensitive and valetudinarian. Such a reading might
immediately appear unattractive. On an unsympathetic view, it seems to
naturalize Percy’s poetry as the imponderable consequence of simple biological
necessity: a vulgarisation of the Romantic fascination with poetic vocation that
would become all too conventional as the century progressed.20 Mary’s visions
of her husband with ‘attenuated frame’ and ‘brilliant eyes’, ‘too delicately
organised for the rough treatment man uses towards man’, and her
descriptions of ‘the restless, passion-fraught emotions of one whose sensibility,
kindled to too intense a life, perpetually preyed upon itself’, are not without
foundation,21 but they make no allowance for Percy Shelley the pamphleteer,
polemicist and prospective co-founder of The Liberal, any more than they allow
for the sometimes intimidating fist-fighter or the skilled shot and sailor. This
matters, because on Mary’s account Percy’s ill-health has a strange propensity
to bring about all kinds of apparently contrary impulses in his poetry.
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‘The very illness that oppressed, and the aspect of death which had
approached so near Shelley’, Mary writes about his poetry of 1817, ‘appears to
have kindled to yet keener life the Spirit of Poetry in his heart. The restless
thoughts kept awake by pain clothed themselves in verse’.22 The way that
sickness ‘kindles’ Percy’s work seems to weaken his ability to direct its course.
Illness is taken to explain both why Queen Mab is so unearthly and
imaginative (arriving at Oxford ‘endowed with the keenest sensibility, and
with the fortitude of a martyr, Shelley came among his fellow creatures [...]
like a spirit from another sphere’), and why it is at the same time so pressingly
didactic (‘[i]ll-health made him believe that his race would soon be run; that a
year or two was all he had of life. He desired that these years should be useful
and illustrious’23). It explains equally well why his next long poem, Alastor, is
so different from Queen Mab, with the cosmological speculations of the earlier
work giving way to acute introspection. While he was writing it, ‘[p]hysical
suffering had [...] considerable influence in causing him to turn his eyes
inward; inclining him rather to brood over the thoughts and emotions of his
own soul, than to glance abroad, and to make, as in “Queen Mab,” the whole
universe the object and subject of his song’.24 His health similarly prompts the
later poetry that Mary sees as born of more or less the sort of gloomy, lonely
rhapsodising that Alastor had held up to sceptical critique. Throughout 1818
‘Shelley suffered greatly in health’ and, ‘exhausted’ by ‘[c]onstant and poignant
physical suffering’,
escaped to solitude, and in verses, which he hid from fear of wounding
me, poured forth morbid but too natural bursts of discontent and sadness.
[…] [E]njoying, as he appeared to do, every sight or influence of earth or
sky, it was difficult to imagine that any melancholy he showed was aught
but the effect of the constant pain to which he was a martyr.25
Mary’s fullest description of how for Percy bodily suffering and literary
creation were intertwined comes in her parallel edition of his prose works,
when she tries to explain the compositional process behind his disquieting
fragment ‘Catalogue of the Phenomena of Dreams’. ‘No man’, she writes,
had such keen sensations as Shelley. His nervous temperament was
wound up by the delicacy of his health to an intense degree of sensibility,
and while his active mind pondered for ever upon, and drew conclusions
from his sensations, his reveries increased their vivacity, till they
mingled with, and were one with thought, and both became absorbing
and tumultuous, even to physical pain.26
The sensations reflected on by Percy’s ‘active mind’ are principally associated
with the tense interaction between his ‘nervous temperament’ and ‘the
delicacy of his health’. His unspecified ‘reveries’ too do not obviously draw on
anything outside the self. When their mingling results ultimately in physical
pain, it becomes clear that the operation Mary describes here is essentially
circular. Through its contamination by reverie, thought has turned into a
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physical sensation of exactly the kind that will in turn be reflected on by new
thoughts. This revolving process casts off literary texts as it goes, without
concerning itself with the external world along the way. More generous
readings of the note are perhaps possible, but to a sceptical eye Mary promises
us nothing more appealing than a self-sustaining closed circle, invention
swelling as it feeds on invention according to the archetypal logic of Romantic
egotism.
This account of Percy’s creativity could not fail to have implications for how
his political opinions would be regarded, and a further passage would have
delighted his enemies twenty years previously:
Through life […] he was a martyr to ill-health, and constant pain wound
up his nerves to a pitch of susceptibility that rendered his views of life
different from those of a man in the enjoyment of healthy sensations.
Perfectly gentle and forbearing in manner, he suffered a good deal of
internal irritability, or rather excitement, and his fortitude to bear was
almost always on the stretch.27
Percy’s hostile critics had always insisted that his radicalism was evidence of
an internal disorder rather than of rational analysis.28 That allegation is
apparently given a solid medical grounding when his closest companion and
chief defender admits coolly that under the pressure of nervous strain his
views of life became overwrought and unhealthy.
Such remarks seem plausibly attributable to Mary’s increasing
conventionality and religiosity. But if she was trying to rehabilitate Percy for a
mass audience by blunting his political edge, then she failed to anticipate the
counter-productive effect of encouraging him to be dismissed in another way,
as degenerate and unmanly: within a decade Thomas Medwin would write of
‘the boy […] whose genius was a sort of malady’,29 anticipating John Campbell
Shairp’s punning description of his poetry as ‘like those fine pearls which […]
are the products of disease in the parent shell’.30 We might also regret the
gender politics that Mary implies. In describing the texts she edits as records
of illness, she seems to cast herself as a devoted nurse who tends to her
husband’s painfully fractured corpus, a role that does not reflect her
sophisticated practice as intellectual and artistic collaborator. Percy himself
often preferred to associate both creative genius and the renovation of our
ethical understanding with exemplary physical well-being, as is evident in his
writings on vegetarianism and on Greek statuary, for instance.31 The
implication that his philanthropy is at odds with sociability and with political
agency is a version of the argument that A Defence of Poetry seeks to rebut, by
describing how the individual set apart from mankind by a heightened
attunement to human sympathies can also shape the main historical currents
of the age. For all these reasons, we might regard with suspicion Mary’s
account of how illness informed ‘the Spirit of Poetry’ in her husband.
Nevertheless, a different view is possible. On Mary’s interpretation, Percy’s
rarefied poetic consciousness manifests itself through its collision with, and
deflection by, the volatile realities of his bodily condition. His languishing,
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hypersensitive frame may be part of the reason why his work threatens to tip
into repetitiveness and self-absorption, but the physicality of creativity is also
what renews his poetry and gives us a way to trace its development. Queen
Mab fuses the ethereal and the didactic; Alastor defines the risks of
introspection; the ‘Stanzas Written in Dejection’ caress his symptoms in
secrecy, whereas the ‘Catalogue of the Phenomena of Dreams’ exposes them to
the light; the political poetry turns private strain into public agitation. If
Percy’s work can be transformed by his ill-health in so many different ways, it
may be that his poetry actively embraces the possibility of metamorphosis in
response to unpredictable shifts in the way its author experiences his body.
Not content to conform to its potential audience’s protocols of understanding, it
will instead let itself be forged by the intimately strange phenomena of
sickness and disease. Physical debility would then become a creative resource
useful to Percy as a problem against which to test metaphysical idealism and
political optimism: an understanding towards which Mary could have been led
by ‘The Sensitive Plant’ and Adonais in particular. It follows that the
connections drawn by Mary between sickness and poetry are not necessarily
her way of attributing that poetry to natural-born genius but can alternatively
be read as a productive occlusion of autonomous authorial will. We may
disagree with Mary’s descriptions of the problems with Percy’s work – we may
identify more continuities between the ‘popular’ and the overtly philosophical
than she acknowledged or see his poetry as cannier about its contexts of
production and reception than she believed it to be – but her attempt to deal
with the supposedly destructive relationship between philanthropy and
sociability by reference to a radically embodied poetics might nevertheless be a
forceful and constructive manoeuvre.
One of Percy’s poems in particular gives us a reason for pursuing this line of
thought. Before her editorial notes of 1839, Mary produced another oblique
idealised biography of her late husband: a beatified Percy is easily recognisable
in Adrian, the hero of her novel The Last Man.32 That novel’s early chapters,
however, imply a slightly different configuration. Early in The Last Man, Lord
Raymond serves as a portrait of Byron at his most self-aggrandising, the
narrator Lionel (who later stands for Mary herself) seems most closely
associated with Percy’s vigorous, nature-loving side, and Adrian figures Percy
specifically as a Godwinian rationalist and optimist so vulnerable to the slings
and arrows of the world that when he is disappointed in love he must be
confined as ‘a maniac’.33 Their passionate homosocial triangle is a reimagining
of Percy’s Julian and Maddalo, in which Maddalo is associated with a Byron
accused of nihilism, Julian is a Shelleyan idealist, albeit closer to Mary’s
Adrian than to her Lionel (and for some readers a broadly sincere self-portrait
but for others heavily ironised),34 and the ‘Maniac’ is a frustrated lover who in
Maddalo’s unreliable eyes had been just like Julian until he was brought low
by misfortune. Both sets of characters, like the Percy of Mary’s fragmentary
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biography, have a further, complex relationship to the real-life friendship
between Percy and Byron.
Percy Shelley and Byron were among one another’s most sophisticated and
valued literary interlocutors, and their friendship stands as a primary example
of the sociability that underlies the work of the British Romantics.35 (Both
were also, of course, participants in the Genevan ghost story competition from
which Frankenstein arose.) Their urbane and gentlemanly style of creative
collaboration is modelled in the night-long philosophical conversations between
Julian and Maddalo. The Maniac, whose long, fragmented soliloquy interrupts
and redirects these discussions, is a classic exercise in the Romantic
iconography of the tortured and outcast genius.36 He is a musician whose
‘fragments of most touching melody’ can pacify the madmen who are the fellow
inhabitants of his lunatic asylum,37 although his music – like ‘the wild
language of his grief [...] Such as in measure were called poetry’ (l.541–2) – is
born of a passion that makes him oblivious to his auditors. Julian and
Maddalo is greatly concerned, then, with the ways in which creativity can be
both a sociable and an alienating force. If the semi-fictionalised Percy Shelley
of Mary’s notes to the Poetical Works is cognate with The Last Man’s Adrian,
and if both are influenced by the Maniac and his ambiguous relationship to the
partly autobiographical Julian, then Percy’s poem is also a valuable resource
for clarifying the possibilities opened up by Mary’s posthumous collaboration
with her husband.
In Percy’s prose dialogue A Refutation of Deism, a deist and a Christian
were intended to demolish one another’s arguments so that a third possibility,
atheism, would win out without having formally been endorsed. Similarly,
Julian and Maddalo presents a debate between two men that does not lead to
dialectical resolution but to a revelation of the blind spots that the two of them
share. The writer of the poem’s Preface – a shrewd although far from
straightforward voice – describes Maddalo’s leading characteristic as ‘an
intense apprehension of the nothingness of human life’. This is something close
to a self-defeating point of view: the intensity of the apprehension of life
constantly puts in question the sincerity of the claim that life is ‘nothingness’.
Maddalo believes that the world offers nothing worthy of commanding his
attention, but from the point of view of the Preface that belief stems merely
from his disdain for ‘the dwarfish intellects that surround him’. His refusal to
commit himself to creative involvement in life only means that he has become
unwittingly the creation of his inferiors. Julian, recognising this, attempts to
develop a position that, in contrast to Maddalo’s, will be self-created and self-
authorised. He believes that oppressive social conditions only reflect a
weakness in the human spirit, destined to disintegrate in the face of a critical
attitude. For him, human fulfilment depends on a radical reinvention of the
world:
it is our will
That thus enchains us to permitted ill –
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We might be otherwise – we might be all
We dream of happy, high, majestical.
Where is the love, beauty and truth we seek
But in our mind? and if we were not weak
Should we be less in deed than in desire?
[…]
those who try may find
How strong the chains are which our spirit bind,
Brittle perchance as straw … We are assured
Much may be conquered, much may be endured
Of what degrades and crushes us. We know
That we have power over ourselves to do
And suffer – what, we know not till we try;
But something nobler than to live and die – (l.170–87)
Julian sees himself as one of ‘those who suffer with their suffering kind’
(l.190), and he intends the breaking of our chains to renovate the world in
favour of human sympathies. Yet his attitude to ‘what degrades and crushes
us’ sounds too casual here. Such abstraction in the interests of the greater good
needs to be combined with a sincere acknowledgement of suffering in
individual cases, and Julian fails that test almost immediately. Presented with
the Maniac as a candidate for his sympathy, he responds abruptly that the
man’s problem is no doubt ‘a want of that true theory […] Which seeks a “soul
of goodness” in things ill’ (l.203–4).
This disagreeable moment might be explained in part by another telling
observation in the Preface. Julian is introduced as ‘an Englishman of good
family, passionately attached to those philosophical notions which assert the
power of man over his own mind’. ‘Man’, privileged sharply over ‘mind’ like
this, seems to indicate a human essence that is not necessarily realised even
in private consciousness. This ironic distancing from our own mental
commitments threatens to make it impossible for us to trust the positive
content of our thoughts; ‘our will’ is not really ours at all. Julian goes on to
declare in the lines above that the mind’s job is to demolish the world as it
stands, to shatter its historical ‘chains’ and replace pre-existing structures
with a reflection of its own ‘beauty and truth’. But equally, the very alterity of
the present world, he says, prevents us from knowing the capacity of our own
mind: our ‘power over ourselves’, the basis of his philosophy, ‘we know not’
until we have exhausted ourselves in trying to bring it to fulfilment in
concrete objective forms. ‘Man’, ‘mind’ and the external world are each
rendered unknowable or suspect by Julian’s optimistic assertions.
Throughout Shelley’s poetry, from Alastor to The Triumph of Life, the problem
with truly passionate idealists is that the alienness of the material world
strikes them with shocking and disabling force; Julian is one of Shelley’s
lessons in the dangers of the perfectibilism by which he was always tempted.
His demand for a world made completely new, no less than Maddalo’s
disregard for life as ‘nothingness’, rejects the possibility that reformers might
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engage creatively both with the world as they find it, and with the constraints
that it imposes inescapably on them. Lived experience is liquidated when
suffering is described as ‘a want of true theory’, and Julian’s sympathetic
benevolence has more in common with Maddalo’s nihilism than he could
admit.
Julian and Maddalo each project the other’s antipathy to creative immersion
in the world on to the Maniac. Julian expects him to share Maddalo’s pride and
his willingness to draw gloomy conclusions about life as a whole from private
setbacks (l.48–52, 206–11), while Maddalo declares explicitly that the Maniac
exhibits the final, disillusioned stage of Julian’s idealism (l.195–201). Yet in
the end the Maniac allows us to see the problems common to the standpoints of
the two friends. Julian and Maddalo both take it for granted that the
windowless lunatic asylum in which they spy on the Maniac is an essentially
appropriate place for him to be, that he demonstrably belongs outside the
social order. His madness, though, stems not from estrangement but from too
deep an immersion in social relationships. Our clearest glimpse of its onset
comes from Maddalo, who knew him immediately before his arrest and
confinement. He ‘cannot say’ exactly what drove him mad but was struck by
the way ‘he seemed hurt, / Even as a man with his peculiar wrong, / To hear
but of the oppression of the strong’ (l.237–45). While yet a free man, it seems,
the Maniac took the evils of the world directly and personally upon himself.
Having confused the general with the particular in such a way that he received
second-hand sorrow as his own, he could not come to terms with a misfortune –
rejection by his lover – that really did afflict him specifically, and he descended
into madness wandering about ‘lonely isles of desert sand’ (l.248). This barren
landscape is the Venetian Lido, a place that Julian loves because its
uninterrupted views allow him to fantasize that his soul is, like his
surroundings, ‘boundless’ (l.14–7), or effectively unencumbered by the material
world.
If Maddalo is right, the Maniac found himself cast out of society precisely on
the basis of his total investment within it. Julian’s refusal to believe that ‘what
degrades and crushes us’ has anything to tell us about the essential ‘power of
man’ might look like a justifiable form of self-preservation when faced
with this story. According to Mary’s notes, however, the predicament that
drove the Maniac towards his collapse is central to Percy’s whole life and
achievement. At the very start of The Poetical Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley
Mary reflects that Percy’s strongest passions ‘must be difficult of
comprehension to the younger generation rising around’. ‘[G]enerous to
imprudence’, he ‘put [his] whole force into the attempt to alleviate for others
the evils of those systems from which he had himself suffered’. For her, the
most remarkable thing about him is this complete unselfishness: ‘any new-
sprung hope of liberty inspired a joy and an exultation more intense and wild
than he could have felt for any personal advantage. Those who have never
experienced the workings of passion on general and unselfish subjects, cannot
understand this’.38 In her opening encomium to her husband’s memory Mary
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raises the possibility that it is not just a large proportion of his poetry that is
hard to understand: so too is the very principle of disinterested philanthropy
that guided his whole life. The Maniac confronts the same problem that Mary
comes across here. If we relinquish our exclusionary sense of self, how can we
retain a standpoint from which to create art and intervene in the world? The
Maniac can soothe his fellow inmates’ lamentations with his piano, but ‘the din
/ Of madmen, shriek on shriek’, begins again as soon as he ceases to play
(l.266–7). How can Percy’s disturbingly selfless poetics have a more lasting
effect than this, and what resources might the Maniac provide to help direct
our sympathy towards a poet who is, for Mary, at once socially marginal and
too deeply socialised?
There is one more connection between her fragmentary biography of Percy
and the fragmented soliloquy of the Maniac. As Nora Crook and Derek Guiton
put it, there runs throughout the latter an ‘immediate sense of frenzied pain’.39
The Maniac’s creativity, like Percy’s, is bound up inextricably with bodily
suffering and decay. Julian discovers him with his ‘pale fingers twined’, his
‘lips [...] In hue too beautiful for health’, his ‘eyes lustrous and glazed’ (l.274–
85), but what looks, when mediated through Julian, like peaceful, languishing
decline emerges in the Maniac’s first words as an excruciating entrapment in
what Percy would later conceive of as the triumphal procession of Life:
‘Month after month,’ he cried, ‘to bear this load
And as a jade urged by the whip and goad
To drag life on, which like a heavy chain
Lengthens behind with many a link of pain! (l.300–3)
Julian’s way of liberating his authentic self was to describe life as it is lived as
merely the spirit’s ‘chains’ (l.181). The Maniac – whose music can ‘charm the
weight / From madmen’s chains’ (l.259–60) – finds that the chains of life define
the thing chained, that the way he is bound to life in its materiality cannot be
put aside. Any attempt at expression ‘burns the brain / And eats into it’ (l.479–
80). He imagines himself as a trodden worm that does not die but
wears a living death of agonies!
As the slow shadows of the pointed grass
Mark the eternal periods, his pangs pass
Slow, ever-moving, – making moments be
As mine seem – each an immortality! (l.415–9)
These lines stayed with Mary. In her novel Valperga, when Euthanasia begs
Castruccio to show clemency to the maniacal, heartbroken Beatrice, she tells
him that ‘moments are years, if they are lengthened out by pain; every
minute that she lives in her dungeon is to her a living death of agony’.40 Julian
had supposed that the Maniac’s lack of true theory had brought upon him
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‘[s]ome living death’ (l.210). The sufferer’s own fevered repetition of the phrase
multiplies its force, turning the living death of physical agony into a crisis that
scrambles the categories of life and death in such a way as to curse its victim
with immortality. Sensation is not the empirically limited event that Julian
and Maddalo sought in their different ways to go beyond. Even within the body
of an ‘instinctive worm’ (l.412), it can lay claim to an experience of infinitude.
The Maniac’s thoughts grow ever more violent, as he recalls his lover’s wish
‘That, like some maniac monk, I had torn out / The nerves of manhood by their
bleeding root / With mine own quivering fingers’ (l.424–6). These tropes of
bodily injury culminate at a decisive moment in his soliloquy, when he bursts
out with a cryptic self-definition. His words confirm the accuracy of Maddalo’s
tentative observation that his chief characteristic is his confusion of the
general with the particular, of ‘the oppression of the strong’ with ‘his peculiar
wrong’:
me – whose heart a stranger’s tear might wear
As water-drops the sandy fountain-stone,
Who loved and pitied all things, and could moan
For woes which others hear not, and could see
The absent with the glance of fantasy,
And with the poor and trampled sit and weep,
Following the captive to his dungeon deep;
Me – who am as a nerve o’er which do creep
The else unfelt oppressions of this earth (l.442–50)
The Maniac projects himself into all the sufferings of the world, sacrificing
discrimination and self-control for the sake of unreserved sympathy. The
difference between the two stages of this self-analysis may, however, be the
most crucial thing of all. At first, with his heart worn down to ‘sandy’
particles, the Maniac becomes like the bare indifferent sands of the Lido that
offered no resistance to Julian’s supposedly ‘boundless’ soul, or like the ‘lone
and level sands’ that ironize human pretensions in ‘Ozymandias’. The next
five lines – however emotionally generous – show that the result of this
scattered blankness is unproductive imaginative dissolution in the sufferings
of others. If the Maniac may earn Julian’s respect by being among ‘those who
suffer with their suffering kind’ (l.190), his passive acquiescence in the
hardships of the poor and the captive makes him represent the bankruptcy of
the goal of a purely imaginative ‘power over ourselves’. It is only when he
makes a second thrust at defining himself, in the last two lines above, that he
moves abruptly beyond Julian’s positions. Bringing to a focus his tropes of
physical hurt, he now offers us the body rather than the imagination as
the starting-point for creative interaction with the world. Maddalo’s
‘oppression[s] of the strong’ creep over and press down on the Maniac like huge
insects. His perception is stripped back to its most basic physiological
component, magnified and raw. Figuring himself as the apex of some global
nervous system, he is at once colossal and microscopic, plugged into a vast
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system of sensation or reduced to a single, quivering electrical fibre.41 The
imaginative vision of the previous lines has intensified to the point of collapse.
Sympathy is replaced by a contentless introspection, by a mechanical and
involuntary transcription of hurt.
As with Mary’s notes, the routing of creativity through the body follows a
complex and indirect path. If the Maniac’s love and pity for ‘all things’
transform the general into the particular by dispersing the self across a
sentimentalised world, then his nerve-like sensitivity does so by bringing the
whole world to bear upon an acutely concentred self. Both kinds of movement
seem necessary if we are to become capable of genuine sympathetic warmth
(he ‘was to thee [his lover] the flame upon thy hearth / When all beside was
cold’, as his next words have it (l.451–2)). Unbounded imaginative projection
and the externalisation of the ‘beauty and truth’ of an ideal ‘power of man’ –
Julian’s project – need to be set against the Maniac’s sensitivity to the force of
localisation and individuality. When the Maniac sees his truest self as like a
sheer fragment of matter – an ‘instinctive worm’ or sensing nerve – he takes a
view that is precisely the reverse of Julian’s attempt to prioritise the power of
man over mind and the power of mind over the external world. Authentic
creation cannot, for him, involve the establishment of such a hierarchy. ‘[I]f we
were not weak / Should we be less in deed than in desire?’ Julian had asked
(l.175–6). The Maniac would not endorse this impatient rhetoric: he is only too
aware that we cannot free ourselves from complicity with a material world
that does not conform to our desires.
In the end it is Julian, not the Maniac, who loses faith in sociability. He
desires to stay with the Maniac in the hope of restoring him to health, but
instead – in what seems to be the poem’s decisive indictment of his claims to
an exemplary benevolence – he pleads business elsewhere and abandons
Venice the next morning (l.582–3).42 Years later Julian learns from Maddalo’s
daughter the story of the Maniac’s later life, but we readers do not: ‘she told
me how / All happened – but the cold world shall not know’ (l.616–7). These
are the poem’s final words. Julian’s mistrust of the world is what brings the
poem to an end: he wants to preserve the Maniac’s story for himself alone.43
That story, however, was about the Maniac’s refusal to countenance anything
other than complete openness to the sociable and tangible worlds beyond his
control, even to the point of catastrophe.
I have argued that the Maniac’s predicament of intense engagement with
society and radical incompatibility with its practices is very similar to the one
that Mary Shelley sees as characterising Percy’s creativity. Julian and
Maddalo encourages us to take seriously her claim that Percy’s writing was
shaped decisively by his experiences of physical suffering. It is not that we
need authorisation from Percy’s poetry in order to read Mary in this way. The
point is, instead, to show how complex her relationship to the texts that she
edits might be, and to suggest that the Shelleys share an interest in the
unshareable: in moments, like the Maniac’s felt reduction to a nerve, that
attend to the elementary preconditions of sensibility. If we are justified in
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seeing the Poetical Works of 1839 as an exercise in collaborative creativity,
then Mary’s elegiac technique might be a subtle way of reading Percy’s life in
terms of his poetry, albeit one that runs alongside a biographical reading of his
poetry that is sometimes too sentimental. The impulses behind Mary’s
annotations are many and various, and we should not reduce them too neatly
into alignment with the poetry that they frame. Nevertheless, it is certainly
true that for both of the Shelleys a fully committed creative artist is habitually
pushed into a form of pathology by the force of his or her encounter with the
world. According to Mary’s notes, physical suffering can be a way of organising
that encounter, and creative self-identity can arise through a certain loss or
surrender of control to the body. A way of reading that at first appears to
endorse a narrow conception of solitary genius may ultimately imply that a
productive disunity exists even within a single embodied self.
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